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This essay expands on my 2007 study of the causes and effects of the trend to “the 
new later motherhood” (first child by birth or adoption at or after 35), to explore 
the unfolding ripple effects of delay by a relatively small set of educated women, of 
diverse races, leading to transformations that affect the whole group. Birth control 
undoes the social systems designed for millennia around the assumption that women 
would be baby machines. But the process of developing new systems has happened 
incrementally to date. Birth timing and delay of or abstention from motherhood 
have served women as the first steps in that process, allowing them to trickle up into 
policy-making roles in business and government where they can begin to represent 
women’s interests. Women nationally have begun to advocate for a more robust 
family-support infrastructure, which could take some of the burden of the production 
of workers from women, and share it with those who benefit most from those well-
educated citizen/workers: business and society. Paradoxically, in the current system 
a family-friendly world becomes possible on a major scale only when significant 
numbers of women delay children or don’t have them at all. 
Motherhood in the contemporary world is basically different from motherhood 
in all millennia past. That’s because birth control makes it a choice instead of 
an inevitable fate for women who have sex. Women don’t have to have children 
anymore, let alone several.1 This is a world-changer, and we’re only beginning 
to register its manifold social, economic, cultural and political effects. Among 
the economic effects are the gradual disentangling and revaluing of the two 
kinds of women’s work—the historically unpaid work of producing and train-
ing the citizenry at home and the paid (frequently underpaid) work outside it. 
Birth control allows women to challenge the nexus of interdependence between 
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reproductive labor and their consequent relegation to lives of service, as carers, 
sex providers, and cheap workers in all fields. 
A key dynamic in the unfolding of these changes has been the trend among 
women around the globe to delay children and start their families later than 
their mothers did—some by a few years, some by decades—or to refrain from 
children altogether. In the U.S., the average age at first birth has risen from 21.4 
in 1970 to 25.2 in 2009. The average U.S. female college graduate starts her 
family at 30 (for male graduates, the average is 32). And where 1 in 100 women 
had her first child at or after 35 in 1970, it is now 1 in 12 (cdc; Mathews and 
Hamilton). This essay expands on the work of my 2007 study of the causes 
and effects of the trend to what I call “the new later motherhood” (first child 
by birth or adoption at or after 35), to explore the unfolding ripple effects of 
delay by a relatively small set of educated women, of diverse races, leading to 
transformations that affect the group of women as a whole.
Historically, the fact that sex leads to children (and lots of them) has kept 
women busy, uneducated and out of decision-making circles for millennia. 
Not acknowledging the importance of women’s home labor to the function-
ing of business was a means for getting the childrearing work done cheaply. 
Mothers are arguably the biggest underwriters of “surplus” value, but there 
was no profit in admitting that since it might lead to demands for … a social 
support network! 
In days past women’s essential contribution to the business world could be 
ignored because they were stuck making it. You could assume that women 
would bear and rear society’s children for free because, if they had sex, they 
would procreate whether they wanted to or not. Those women who did work 
outside the home were hobbled by their lack of education (due to early child-
bearing) and by their need for flexible schedules to care for kids in the absence 
of any national care system. Women operated in a discriminatory, artificially 
constrained labor pool (all of the jobs open to them were linked to what they 
were doing at home for free—teacher, nurse, cook, cleaner, sex worker) and 
faced lots of competition (all the other constrained women) within those few 
trades. So their wages were low. The fact that their jobs were done for free at 
home contributed to the general view that the work was not worth much.
Reliable and effective birth control transformed the scene that had kept 
women in political and economic bondage. Over the past two centuries, 
birth control (in the form of condoms, abortion, self-restraint, diaphragms, 
withdrawal, iuds, and hormonal products like the Pill) lowered the number of 
children the average U.S. woman has, from seven in 1800, to 3.6 in 1900, to 
1.9 today (and 1.6 in Canada) (Gordon 22; Hamilton; cia). In the nineteenth 
century the voluntary motherhood movement played a role in the achieve-
ments of the suffrage movement. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, 
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hormonal and other forms of birth control have enabled women to participate 
more fully in civic life.
Fewer children overall means that families and society can increase their 
human capital investment in each individual child. Fewer pregnancies and 
fewer young ones at home also allows the expansion of the human capital and 
the workforce participation of mothers—affording them more time for educa-
tion and more time to invest in paid employment overall. Educated women in 
good jobs, with money of their own to spend, can then become increasingly 
influential. For the first time in recorded history, women can be active citizens 
in their nations, with seats at the table when policy is made and a say in the 
shaping of a nation’s rules and priorities.
But while some women have moved into policy-making roles in business 
and government, it’s been a trickle up rather than a flood. Though 50.8 percent 
of the U.S. population is female and women make up 51.5 percent of middle 
managers and professionals, currently just 16 percent of Congress members are 
women (down from a high of 17 percent in 2008), 3.2 percent of Fortune 500 
ceos, and 15.7 percent of board members (Catalyst). The slow pace of progress 
is in large part due to the fact that progress hasn’t already occurred. Circularly, 
the lack of a family-support infrastructure in the U.S. has held women back 
from advancing in sufficient numbers into positions where they could institute 
such an infrastructure. Instead they’re held back with the familiar dirty laundry 
list of inequities (unfair pay, inadequate childcare and sick leave, job ghettos, 
old-boy networks, limited career tracks, and more [most of these negatively 
affect women without children as well due to the childbearing role of women 
as a group]). Similar dynamics operate in some other nations, though many 
offer more generous family support.
What progress has been made worldwide in moving women into better wages 
and expanded influence is in important part due to the decision by increasing 
numbers to delay the start of their families into their 30s and 40s, or to have 
no children. As we’ll see, women have benefitted, both individually and as a 
group, when they’ve timed births to occur after they’ve completed their educa-
tions and established at work. Absent a national family support system, delay 
has supplied women with a shadow benefits system. More and more women 
have noticed this and many have followed suit, where possible. 
The constant media warnings about the dangers of delay often imply that 
women who wait into their thirties and forties to start their families are self-
ish, foolish, or both. Such pieces frequently overstate the dangers of infertility 
(which are real enough for women in their late 30s and early 40s, so accurate 
data would be sufficient warning) and overlook the equally real economic pres-
sures that push women to wait until they feel financially and professionally, as 
well as personally, ready for family. Such discussions also overlook the extent 
to which the movement of women as a group into positions of active influence 
in all spheres has depended on delay.
Fertility Rate and Birth Timing Trends
The effects of hormonal birth control, in concert with expanded education and 
work opportunities, have included both a decline in the total number of births 
and a rise in the ages at which women begin their families. Figure 1 tracks 
shifts over the last century in the fertility rate (births per year to women aged 
15 to 44). A decline was already underway at the turn of the twentieth century, 
and it was steepened by the depression. That was followed by a sharp rise after 
the war and through the fifties and a quick fall again after the introduction 
of the Pill in 1960.
Though the U.S. fertility rate has been basically flat since the early 1970s, 
it has responded in small ways to the economic climate. The recent recession 
(2007-2010) has reduced both the number of births overall and the fertility 
rate. While the total number of births has declined, the average age at which 
U.S. women have their first child has risen—from 21.4 in 1970 to 25.2 in 2009 
(cdc) (see Figure 2). 
Figure 3 indicates the rise in the numbers of first births to women over 35, 
from 1971 to 2009. The fertility rate overall fell seven percent between 2007 
Figure 1: US General Fertility Rate 1909-2009
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Figure 2. Average Age of Mother at First Birth: United States, 1970-2009. 
cdc Natality Statistics.
did arrive that they could not otherwise have accessed. Because they had 
experience their employers wanted to hold onto and because they had proved 
themselves trustworthy over years, their employers were also more open than 
they would otherwise have been to allowing them to telecommute or to move 
to pro-rated part-time work. My analysis of 2000 census data confirmed the 
anecdotal evidence of the interviews, demonstrating that women who delayed 
made substantial long-term salary gains relative to women of the same educa-
tion level who gave birth earlier (Gregory 2007). 
The positive effect of delay on compensation has been further documented 
by Amalia Miller, who found (based on a pool of women who first gave birth 
between 20 and 34) that women who delay and get a college degree or more 
(the benefit accrues only to women who graduate from college) go on to gain 
five percent in wages per year of delay, and 12 percent or more in earnings per 
year of delay (see also Buckles).3 The increase in earnings is made possible by 
increased hours on the job (due first to delayers’ lack of children in the early 
stages of their careers, and later to the ability their higher wages afford them 
to hire consistent good childcare).
Not only will the families of later mothers be better off financially on aver-
age and better educated, they are also more likely to have two parents at home 
to share the work of childrearing. The increase in births to single mothers is 
overwhelmingly a younger phenomenon, and when later mothers are single 
and 2010 (including a 17 percent decline in the teen rate), and while rates in 
all age sectors under 40 fell, including a 2.4 percent fall in the birth rate among 
women 35-39, the rate among women 40-44 rose eight percent while the rate 
for women 45+ held steady.2 The fall in later births between 2006 and 2009 in 
Figure 3 reflects the recessionary fall in births to women 35 to 39. 
 
The Effects of Delay
My 2007 study, based on birth and census data analysis and interviews with 
113 women of diverse races from around the U.S. who had their first child at 
or after 35, by birth or adoption, found that most women delayed for one or 
more of four basic reasons: to complete their educations, to establish at work, 
to find the right partner for the long term, and to see something of the world 
and mature before settling down. These choices are made possible not just by 
birth control, but also by the public health gains of the past 100 years, which 
have added thirty years to the average life span. Clearly, women would not be 
able to delay childbearing into their mid-30s and later if their life expectancy 
were still 47, as it was in 1900.
The women I interviewed told me that delay enabled them to climb the 
ladders at work, to achieve higher wages than they would have been able to if 
they had not delayed, and to command flexible schedules when their children 
Figure 3: Number of U.S. Women Giving First Birth at 35 and Above, Cumulative by Age of Mother. 
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mothers their higher average wages allow them to hire help that younger 
mothers cannot afford. New later mothers tend to be in peer marriages, with 
partners who have a similar education and a similar wage or earning capacity, 
which means that they tend also to share housework and childcare more equally 
than couples with differing education and wage levels. Perhaps as a result of 
all these factors, older mothers also report being substantially happier for the 
long term than mothers who start earlier (Myrskylä and Margolis).
Staying at Work and Equalizing Pay in Spite of Family-Unfriendly 
Policies
It is well known that women overall earn less for the same job than do men—the 
current figure is 77 cents on the dollar, with lower rates for women of color. 
Explanations have varied, from plain discrimination (women seen to be less 
deserving of full pay because, as the entirely inaccurate claim goes, “they don’t 
have to support a family”), to time lost in the job due to shorter hours worked 
in the years when children are young, to employers’ unwillingness to invest in 
female employees because they expect that they are likely to leave or reduce 
their hours (often a self-fulfilling prophecy when women are underpaid and 
cannot afford the childcare necessary to staying at work full time). All of these 
factors play roles in the lower pay outcome (aauw). 
The higher pay that later mothers enjoy is at least in part due to avoidance 
of the second of these dynamics. Census data reveals that later mothers are 
more likely to stay at work full time with young children than younger mothers 
(Gregory 2007, 110)—a situation that maintains their wage at the same time 
that it keeps them in the pipeline for advancement to positions of influence 
where they can shape policy. This does not resolve the issue of unequal pay, 
but it assists with lessening inequality for the group that behaves thus. 
In our family-unfriendly nation, the lack of infrastructure to support families 
and caregivers—including lack of paid parental leave, lack of paid sick leave for 
all workers (so that caregivers don’t have to lose pay or their job when they or 
their kids get sick), lack of equal pay, and lack of a system of good, affordable 
childcare—means that women are punished for having children. Since the nation 
and employers have interests in convincing women to procreate (so that there 
will be a workforce in years to come) and in ensuring that their children are 
decently educated (so that that workforce will be sufficiently skilled), it might 
seem logical that they would want to make it attractive for women and their 
partners to choose to have children. In some industries that seems to be the 
case, but the business world as a whole has not embraced this logic to date. 
In the U.S., the total fertility rate has stayed relatively high over the years 
(it’s currently slightly below replacement at 1.9 kids / woman [Hamilton] 
compared to Italy’s 1.39, German’s 1.41 and Japan’s 1.21 [cia]). In part this 
has been the case because women have felt that they do have some flexibility 
and support here (immigration also plays a role in keeping the rate up). But 
the recession is changing that: the birth rate is declining fast at the very time 
when the population of elders in need of a vibrant force of younger workers 
to supply them with services as they retire is expanding.
In good times, paying women less for out-of-home employment may have 
been expected to operate as a form of encouragement to stay home and have 
kids. But these days, failure to support families may well have a discouraging 
effect on the fertility rate, adding to the downward pressure already being 
exerted on the rate by the recession. Rejection of equity initiatives may turn 
out to be not just a continuation of the status quo; they may provide women 
with more evidence that mothers’ work is not respected and more reason not 
to do that work. As is the case in nations around the world, U.S. business and 
government will need to explore the relation between their interests in shoring 
up the fertility rate on the one hand and in keeping women’s wages low and 
limiting family services on the other. 
Class 
While later mothers tend to be financially better off when they have children, 
they do not all start out that way. Delay for purposes of education and work can 
be a class elevator. When working class women pursue education and establish 
themselves in jobs before they start their families, they may wind up rearing 
middle-class children. This was the case with a fair number of the women I 
interviewed—white, black and Hispanic.
But delay, and especially extended delay, is not always either desired or 
possible. Many people want to start their families while they are young, 
or at any rate not verging on middle age, or find themselves pregnant and 
choose to have the child. This reduces the likelihood that they will finish 
their degrees or, if they do, that they will be able to afford the childcare that 
would enable them to work consistently. Additionally, middle-class women 
as a group grow up with much more of an expectation that they will go to 
college than do working-class women. Their schooling, whether in private or 
public schools, tends to prepare them better for college, since public school 
quality varies widely by neighborhood and by the amount of added value in 
terms of time, money and human capital parents can contribute. As Kathryn 
Edin and Maria Kefalas demonstrated in their study of poor, single moms 
of diverse races—the lack of good job prospects for working-class women 
and their partners created by the decline in U.S. manufacturing fuels their 
trend to having children early and on their own. But some women are able 
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group includes many immigrants, and a somewhat smaller part in the story of 
black women, but in both groups it is also an important part, as my interviews 
document, and one that is on the increase. 
Intersections of gender, race, class and sexuality inform the opportunities 
open to all of us. Delaying motherhood has served as a workaround for many 
women seeking to combine work and family. But it does not serve all, at least 
not directly. 
Policy and Politics
There is, however, at least the possibility that it could assist all, indirectly. While 
women who delay see individual benefits, they may also shift the environment 
for women overall. This may occur through the action of others; for instance, 
when administrators (male and female) introduce family-friendly work poli-
cies in order to retain good female workers in whom they have invested much 
training or who demonstrate skills or have experience the business wishes to 
retain. Such policies may also assist them in recruiting other good workers, 
and may be extended to the group of all employees within a company. Overall, 
however, the flex benefits extended in some companies to female workers have 
not consistently been extended to women who are not full-time, white-collar 
workers. 
More change comes when women themselves make new policy. The group 
of women in policy-making roles includes those who had no children, those 
who delayed, and those who had children earlier and were able to move up. 
While there is no one route up the career ladder, women who have delayed 
are an important part of the expanding pool of female policy makers. In the 
Senate, for example, more than half of the current 17 female members either 
have no children or had their first in their mid-30s. 
So far, due in important part to the still relatively small numbers of women 
in policy roles in both business and government, feminist policy change has 
been limited. But we have seen some efforts at change—and in some cases, 
some success. The most well-known recent example of feminist legislation is 
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, which passed through the efforts of 
female legislators. The Ledbetter Act was not an advance in itself, however, but 
a corrective to a 2008 Supreme Court ruling that had set back women’s access 
to compensation for discrimination. Soon after the Ledbetter vote, the same 
female legislators and their supporters were able to introduce but not to pass 
the Paycheck Fairness Act, which attempted to give teeth to the unenforceable 
Fair Pay Act of 1963. It failed because it was perceived as bad for business, but 
it has been reintroduced in 2012.
Similarly, in 2008, U.S. Representative Jackie Speier (a new later mother 
to use the combination of birth control, education and delay as a ladder out 
of poverty. 
The 2007-2010 recessionary birth rate decline and the related increase in 
the numbers of young women going to college directly out of high school (up 
almost six percent between 2007 and 2010 [Bureau of Labour Statistics 2007, 
2010]) has created a natural experiment on the effect of delay on the education 
and work opportunities of women, including working-class women. Over the 
next few years, we will be able to track the effect of delay and education on 
the earnings and experience of the cohort of women of various class positions 
and races who, absent the recession, would have been prone to early births. 
The availability of birth control, currently under attack in quite a few states, 
will be a factor in the outcome. 
Race
Among biological mothers who started their families at or after age 35 in 
2010, 63.14 percent were white, 9.12 percent black, 13.43 percent Hispanic, 
13.08 percent Asian Pacific Islander, and 0.42 percent American Indian and 
Alaska Native (aian). Viewed comparatively, in 2010 9.05 percent of white 
first births were to new later moms, 5.21 percent of black first births, 5.37 
percent of Hispanic first births, 15.39 percent of Asian and 3.27 percent of 
aian (Hamilton 2011, 24). These rates correlate roughly to the proportion 
of college graduates within each group (in 2000, when most of these women 
were 25-29, 34 percent of whites 25-29 had a ba, as did 17.8 percent of blacks 
in that age group, 9.7 percent of Hispanics and 54.3 percent of Asians [ies]). 
Apart from Hispanics, with a low level of college completion due to a variety 
of issues including language and immigration, the rate of later births within 
each group is between 25 and 30 percent of the number of college graduates 
(26.6 percent for whites, 29.2 percent for blacks, and 28.3 percent for Asians; 
with Hispanics at 55 percent). The consistency across the first three groups 
suggests that the race is less a factor than education level in determining who 
will delay. 
But who has access to education is a class issue that often overlaps with race 
and culture. In 2009, 39 percent of Hispanic first time mothers 40-44 had a 
ba or higher, a low level compared to the 69 percent of whites, 52 percent 
of blacks and 68 percent of Asians in the same bracket. But that number has 
grown substantially from 2000, when 32 percent of Hispanic first time later 
mothers had a ba—an increase of 22 percent (compared to a 12 percent rise 
among whites in the same period, a 17 percent rise among blacks and a 24 
percent rise among Asians). Higher education plays a markedly smaller part 
in the delay stories among Hispanic women at this point in history when the 
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hood centers, staffed by trained and well-paid professionals, and provides 
good, affordable care to all the children in the area whose parents chose it. 
Such centers could also offer parenting classes and drop-in care linked to the 
health care system. Different kinds of centers could involve different costs to 
parents, who could choose among the available options. Payments could be on 
a sliding-scale, with underwriting from some combination of employers and 
the tax payers (in the big picture, the major beneficiaries). 
Such centers would create hundreds of thousands of good jobs, many of 
which would go to women. They would differ from current childcare positions 
in levels of pay, training, and respect. The human capital of teachers would 
grow as well as that of kids. Such centers would change the current culture 
around childcare—countering the current guilt-inducing media coverage 
that misrepresents childcare’s role. Good childcare has much to offer kids in 
terms of socialization, range of activities, structured environment, and skills 
development, especially if it’s combined with flexible work arrangements that 
allow parents to cut back on work to be with kids as needed.
At the same time, such centers would lessen the pressure on women to 
delay childbearing, because they would not need to wait until their salary was 
high before they could afford the kind of childcare they desired (part of the 
reason many women wait) and, since they had access to good reliable care, 
they would not lose traction in their careers. Such policy would realign the 
operation and valuation of women’s work in the United States on many levels. 
House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (not a later mother but the mother of 
several) stated in 2011 that the next legislative initiative on her agenda was 
comprehensive childcare. If she does indeed push it forward, she would be 
speaking for a big constituency.
Infertility 
At the same time that delay creates opportunity for many women, it also creates 
a risk of infertility. This too has costs. The huge majority of women cannot be-
come pregnant and give birth after 44 with their own genetic material. Roughly 
one third of women are infertile at 40, at 41 more than 50 percent cannot get 
pregnant on their own, and after that the numbers decline precipitously. (For 
more discussion, see Gregory.) 
Some women who encounter infertility go on adopt. Others try ivf, with 
their own eggs or those of a donor. ivf success rates with a woman’s own eggs 
vary widely by her age.
With donor eggs from young women, on the other hand, the success rate 
for recipients of all ages is 55.1 percent with fresh embryos and 33.8 percent 
with donated eggs that were frozen and used later (all success rate data from 
and the first woman to deliver a child while in office in the California Legis-
lature) proposed a Presidential Commission on Women to explore the status 
of women in the nation, including issues like pay inequity and lack of female 
representation in public office. The proposal was supported by women’s groups 
but did not get presidential endorsement (President Obama, himself a new 
later dad [at 36 and 39] whose working wife had her children at 34 an 37, had 
just inaugurated an interagency council focused on government policies toward 
women and girls). The commission’s proposed inquiries into pay inequity were 
also perceived as threatening to business. 
Of course such legislation does challenge a certain kind of business—the 
kind that depends on paying its workers unfairly. But higher wages in workers’ 
pockets would lead to more demand for services (one service women workers 
would immediately spend their increased wages on would be good childcare). 
Thus the long run effect on business overall need not be negative, though there 
would of course be work to do to design the fairest and most efficient fair-wage 
system. And there would be dispute, based on interest group. Again, the initial 
factor for getting women’s concerns addressed will lie in arriving at a point 
where women’s voices are influential enough to be taken seriously.
Perhaps the more threatening aspect of such inquiries as Speier proposed is 
their initiation of an overt national dialogue about the way pay works in U.S. 
culture. Of course many are fiercely opposed to having such a dialogue, since 
it risks revealing inequities operative along class and gender lines that chal-
lenge the American Dream narrative of fairness and equal opportunity. The 
discussion has had a major opening, however, through the Occupy Wall Street 
movement. The dynamics of motherhood, gender, race and class are becoming 
part of that discussion increasingly. Much of the recent critique of national 
family policy is powered by research on the economics, sociology and politics 
of motherhood and inequity by scholars who are themselves later mothers (or 
the partners of later mothers), or who have no children as yet (some of those 
intending to have none, others planning to start their families later).
Along with pay equity, perhaps the most helpful policy change for families 
would be a good, affordable childcare system. Currently such care is available 
to relatively few children, but society as a whole suffers the consequences when 
the young children who will be the workforce of the future spend much of their 
formative years stationed in front of televisions, without stimulating games 
or engaged caregivers. Lack of good care connects to diminished resources 
for employers and to life-time poverty and diminished opportunities both for 
the children who do not receive good, consistent care and those mothers who 
against their own desires must cut short their own educations and reduce their 
lifetime earnings and retirement incomes. There are many ways that a national 
childcare system might be configured: the French model includes neighbor-
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onstrated, nobody is going to make the argument for women except women, 
along with a few men supported and pushed by female colleagues. Thus, the 
societal benefit of delay: only if sufficient numbers of women become policy-
makers will they be able to create a family-friendly environment that does not 
require women who want a sustained career to wait to start a family if they 
prefer to do so earlier. 
There are enormous issues in play here, and the next few decades will see 
major transformations. Birth control undoes the social systems designed for 
millennia around the assumption that women would be baby machines. But 
the process of developing new systems has taken time and happened incre-
mentally to date. Birth timing and delay of or abstention from motherhood 
have served women as the first steps in that process, allowing them to trickle 
up into policy-making roles in business and government where they can begin 
to represent women’s interests. Women nationally have begun to advocate for a 
more robust family-support infrastructure, which could take some of the burden 
of the production of workers from women, and share it with those who benefit 
most from those well-educated citizen/workers: business and society. The 
current politicization of birth control pushes back against women’s increasing 
political weight. Paradoxically, in the current system a family-friendly world 
becomes possible on a major scale only when significant numbers of women 
delay children or don’t have them at all. 
1Even when women don’t have direct access to birth control or information 
about it, which is increasingly the case in some areas, someone is choosing not 
to provide that access. Efforts to restrict birth control and abortion access, 
some of which claim to be about existential and moral questions, often involve 
attempts to undercut the radical effects of birth control—both realized and 
potential—on the economies of the world and on our patriarchal work and 
reward system. No surprise that changes in the structure of maternity also 
affect the economics of patriarchy.
2From 2007 to 2010, the overall birth rates plunged 17 and 16 percent, respec-
tively, among U.S. women ages 15-19 and 20-24. The declines shrink with each 
step up the age ladder: -9 percent among those 25-29, -4 percent among 30 to 
34-year-olds, and -2.4 percent among women 35 to 39. The rate for women 
ages 40-44 rose eight percent in the same period. Rates for first births were 
similar, except among 30 to 34-year-olds, whose rate rose one percent in 2010. 
(All data from cdc Birth Data Reports for the years in question.) Census data 
for the first half of 2011 indicate that the overall decline continued (Frey). 
3The overall wage gain to all women averages out to three percent but the 
gain is only realized by college graduates, at five percent, with earnings aver-
Age of 
Mother <35 35-37  38-40 41-42                 >42
Fresh 
 
41.4%  31.7%  22.3%  12.6%              4.2%
Thawed 35.6%  30.9 %  26.1%  22.1%                    13.9%4
2009 [sart]). All of these methods are expensive (at least $15,000 and often 
higher). 
Clearly there are both personal and economic consequences to infertility. 
Later births can involve increased rates of health problems for mother and 
child, which add an additional element of financial and emotional expense. 
There is also a societal loss when women and men who want children don’t 
have them. On the other hand, some women who delay past the point of 
fertility remain childless with equanimity. Some who delay and use fertility 
treatments successfully are pleased. 
In order to make informed choices about family and work, it’s important for 
women to have full and accurate data on all the potential tradeoffs involved in 
their birth timing choices, from both the work and family sides. 
Mandated fertility insurance is one way to lessen the cost of fertility 
treatment to women—not only for those who become infertile due to delay, 
but for those who encounter infertility due to endocrinal or other health or 
structural issues, or those whose partners are infertile. Currently fifteen states 
offer such insurance, which adds minimally to everyone’s cost of insurance 
but substantially lowers the cost to individuals and cuts the price of treat-
ments overall through economies of scale. Coverage also equalizes access to 
treatment. Treatment does not guarantee success however, so insurance is 
not a cure-all. Though women delay for many reasons, insofar as they delay 
in order to be able to afford good childcare and to ensure that their progress 
up the job ladder is not impeded by having to step out of the work stream, 
one of most effective ways to avoid infertility would be to institute a good, 
affordable national childcare system!
Conclusion
As a group, women have been working for ages to get our voices represented 
in the polity and our concerns heard. As the experience of millennia has dem-
Figure 4: IVF Success Rates with Non-donor Eggs, 2009
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Miller, Amalia. “The Effects of Motherhood Timing on Career Path.” Journal 
of Population Economics 24 (3) ( July 2011): 1071–1100. Web.
Myrskylä, Mikko and Rachel Margolis. “Happiness: Before and After the 
Kids.” Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research Working Papers. 
2012. Cited by permission. Web.
Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (sart). Clinic Summary Report, 
2009. Web. <https://www.sartcorsonline.com/rptcsr_PublicMultYear.
aspx?Clinicpkid=0>.
aging roughly 12 percent. The figures given here extrapolate from the study’s 
conclusions about the wages of all women, and were confirmed in email cor-
respondence with Miller.
4Thawed rates are higher for non-donor eggs for women 38+ because they were 
harvested when the mother was younger. Thawed rates are lower for donor 
eggs because freezing lessens viability somewhat.
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